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Abstract
I propose a new framework to study the intertemporal labor supply hypothesis. I
use an exogenous source of variation in maternal net earning opportunities, generated
through school entrance age of children, to study intertemporal labor supply behavior.
Employing data from the 1980 US Census and the NLSY, I estimate the e¤ect of a one
year delay in school attendance on long run maternal labor supply. IV estimates imply
that having a 5 year old enrolled in school increases labor supply measures for married
women, with no younger children, by between 7 to 34 percent. Further, using a sample
of 7 to 10 year olds from the NLSY, I investigate persistence in employment outcomes
for a married mother whose child delayed school entry. Results point towards long run
intertemporal substitution in labor supply. Rough calculations yield an uncompensated
wage elasticity of 0.76 and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1.1.
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1 Introduction
The intertemporal labor supply hypothesis states that leisure is easily substitutable across
periods. Hence, small and temporary movements in the perceived real wage induce indi-
viduals to allocate their time in a way such that periods of high labor supply coincide with
periods of high transitory wages. The standard measure of this e¤ect is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution which is predicted to be positive so that individuals work more
during periods of high wages holding the marginal utility of wealth constant. A key con-
cern, however, in estimating labor supply elasticities is that it is hard to nd temporary and
exogenous movements in real wages that can identify movements in labor supply. In the
absence of good instruments for wage changes, most studies of intertemporal labor supply
treat wages as exogenous.
In this paper, I use an exogenous source of variation in maternal net earning opportuni-
ties, generated through school entrance age of children, to study intertemporal labor supply
behavior. Changes in maternal labour supply, over time, are determined, to a large extent,
by the process of substitution between market and household work associated with bringing
up children. In the absence of informal sources of child care, most parents have to incur child
care costs in order to become employed. One of the biggest sources of child care subsidies for
parents is the availability of schools. A child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized
kindergarten, increases the likelihood of employment by increasing a mothers net wage at
the employment margin. This implies that delaying entry to school may impose an additional
year of child care for the mother and consequently a year less in the labor market. The main
aim of this paper is to measure the extent to which mothers respond to this additional year
of child care costs by substituting current work for future work. The identication strategy
relies on comparing labor supply responses, over time, for two groups of women; those whose
5 year olds were enrolled in kindergarten and those who delayed enrollment of their child to
age 6.
Uncovering the causal relation between age at enrollment and maternal labor supply is
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problematic because unobserved characteristics of parents and children are correlated with
school entrance age. To deal with the endogeneity of school entrance age and, therefore, to
identify the causal e¤ect of delayed school entry, I exploit the exogenous variation in child
month of birth and state kindergarten entrance age laws.
This paper adds to the growing body of literature that examine how public preschool
availability a¤ects maternal labor supply (Baker, Gruber and Milligan 2008; Berlinski and
Galiani 2007; Cascio 2009; Fitzpatrick 2010; Gelbach 2002; Schlosser 2006). The contribution
of this paper to this literature is twofold. First, I look at the e¤ect of delayed school entry
on long run maternal labor market outcomes as opposed to focusing only on a single period
estimate. To my knowledge, this is the rst study that explores the dynamic aspect of the
school entry age and maternal labor supply relation. Second, I allow for the fact that some
mothers may benet from delaying school enrollment of their children while others may
be hurt by it. The estimation strategy provides consistent estimates of the Local Average
Treatment E¤ect (LATE) of entrance age on outcomes even if there is heterogeneity in the
entrance age e¤ect (Barua and Lang, 2010).
This paper also contributes to the literature that uses natural experiments and di¤erences-
in-di¤erences methods to study intertemporal labor supply. Unlike those studies, I abstract
from wage considerations and employ an alternative to directly inferring the intertemporal
substitution e¤ect from the relation between wages and labor supply. By examining the
labor supply response to a variation in net earning opportunities that is credibly exogenous,
I am able to estimate the extent of intertemporal substitution in maternal labor supply. In
addition, the empirical strategy gives me a simple method to isolate substitution e¤ects from
wealth e¤ects.
Using data from the US Census 1980 PUMS, I nd that married women whose youngest
child is 5 years old increase their labor supply by 7-34 percentage points if their ve year old
is enrolled in school. In contrast to the results for married mothers, there is no statistically
signicant e¤ect on labor market outcomes for single mothers. Further, using a sample of
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7 to 10 year old children from the NLSY, I investigate persistence in employment outcomes
for a married mother whose child delayed school entry. Results obtained from analyzing the
two data sets points towards intertemporal substitution in labor supply. In particular, when
evaluated between age 7 and 10, the labor supply of a mother whose child delayed school entry
increases by 12 percentage points relative to that of the mother whose child went to school
at age 5. This increase can be attributed to a pure wealth e¤ect. Rough calculations yield
an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.76, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of 1.1 and a wealth elasticity of -0.37.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical
background that explores the relation between school entrance age and intertemporal mater-
nal labor supply. In Section III, I address identication issues as well as outline the empirical
model used in the baseline regressions. Section IV discusses data and sample selection issues
and presents some summary statistics. Section V presents the main ndings and results
obtained from the baseline models. Finally, I conclude the discussion in section VI with
particular emphasis on implications for education policy.
2 School Entrance Age and Intertemporal Maternal
Labor Supply: Theoretical Background
The main issue in the empirical estimation of the intertemporal labor supply elasticities is
the endogeneity of intertemporal wage changes since labor supply today depends on past
and expected future wages. In the absence of a good instrument, most studies treat wages
as exogenous or use age and education related variables as instruments for life cycle wage
changes (Altonji, 1986).
Recently several researchers have used natural experiments and di¤erences-in-di¤erences
approach to estimate intertemporal labor supply using cross-sectional variation in wages.
The main motive behind these empirical strategies is to exploit certain life cycle events or
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policy changes that generate exogenous and anticipated wage changes that can be used to
estimate intertemporal elasticities. Mulligan (1999) uses the termination of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) as a life cycle event that causes an anticipated wage
shock to study changes in labor supply over time. Several studies have used di¤erences-
in-di¤erences estimates to measure the e¤ect of tax reforms on labor supply (Eissa, 1995;
Eissa and Liebman, 1995; Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998). However, there are serious
concerns of selection bias and the possible endogenous nature of wage changes in these
studies. In addition, the choice of control groups is questionable in most of these studies.1
In this paper, I propose a new framework to study the intertemporal labor supply hy-
pothesis. A child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized kindergarten, increases a
mothers e¤ective wage at the employment margin. However, there is substantial variation in
the age at which a child may begin school. Thus, school entrance ages provide an exogenous
source of variation in the net earning opportunities for a mother. I exploit this variation
to study intertemporal labor supply behavior among mothers of school age children. Before
explaining the empirical strategy, it would be worthwhile to understand how school entrance
age a¤ects maternal labor supply within a multiperiod context.
Gelbach (1999) shows that for mothers who would otherwise have not worked, free public
school enrollment provides a 100% price subsidy for child care at the margin. This would
increase her e¤ective wage at the employment margin increasing the price of leisure relative
to the price of consumption. This, in turn, would make her substitute towards work and
away from leisure. For women who would choose to work more hours than the length of the
school day, public school enrollment would be like an income transfer equal to the number of
hours spent in school times the market hourly price of child care. Therefore, the budget set
has a kink at the point that represents the length of the school day. Women located at the
kink receive both a price subsidy and an income subsidy. Economic theory thus predicts that
those women who work less than the number of hours of school day are the ones who are most
1See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3A for a review of these
studies.
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likely to increase their labor supply in response to this subsidy. This has implications for
di¤erent subgroups of women since single women, on an average, work more hours compared
to married women.
However, not all women receive this subsidy at the same time. This is because children
enter school at di¤erent ages depending upon parental preferences and/or state laws gov-
erning kindergarten entrance ages. In the United States, state laws require a child to turn
ve by the state cut-o¤ date to be eligible to attend kindergarten in the beginning of the
academic year, usually, in September. As a consequence, children born just before the state
cut-o¤ are almost a year younger, when they enter kindergarten, relative to children born
after the cut-o¤. For example in California, where the cut-o¤ is December 2nd, the youngest
child in a class (born on December 1st) would be allowed to enter kindergarten in September
when he is just four years and nine months old compared to the oldest child (born after the
cut-o¤) who would be a year older. In Indiana where the cut-o¤ is July 1st, the youngest
child in a class would be ve years and two months old when he enters school in September.
This di¤erence in chronological age between the youngest and the oldest kindergartner also
generates variation in the time period at which a mother receives the implicit child care
subsidy. This is shown below in the gure. Figure 1 illustrates the wage proles of two
mothers who are identical in all observable characteristics but di¤er in the age at which they
send their child to school.
ln (Wt)
t    t+1 Age of the Child
A
 B
C
D
E
  F
Figure 1: Wage Profile of a Constrained and an Unconstrained
Woman
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The constrainedwoman refers to the mother whose child begins kindergarten at age 6
while the unconstrainedrefers to a mother who sends her child to school at age 5. The
life cycle wage proles of the two women are identical except at the time period t that
corresponds to the year the child turns 5. At time t, the unconstrained mother receives
a child care subsidy in the form of free or subsidized schooling that increases her e¤ective
wage causing her wage prole to shift upwards (given by the curve ABCD). The constrained
mother receives this subsidy in period t+1, corresponding to the year the child turns 6, and
her wage prole shifts up by the same amount (the curve AEFD). An implicit assumption
is that there is no loss in human capital accumulation associated with joining the workforce
a year later. Given the wage proles of the two women, how would their labor supply di¤er
over the life cycle assuming an environment of perfect certainty?
Theoretically (MaCurdy,1981), labor supplied by the two women would di¤er over their
life-cycle because of two reasons. First, in response to the higher net wages at period t the
unconstrained mother would increase her labor supply relative to the labor supplied by the
constrained mother. She adjusts her labor supply in response to intertemporal wage changes
along her life cycle wage prole keeping lifetime wealth constant. This labor supply response
to intertemporal wage changes along an individuals life cycle wage prole is measured by
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution . The total increase in labor supply at period
t due to this e¤ect is given by the absolute value of di¤erence between the net wages times
the intertemporal elasticity : There is, however, an additional e¤ect on labor supply. The
unconstrained mother has higher lifetime wealth relative to the constrained mother given by
the area BEFC in gure 1 above. This implies that at all time periods her labor supply will
be lower than the labor supplied by the constrained mother. This represents a pure wealth
e¤ect associated with higher lifetime income. The sign on the e¤ect of the subsidy on labor
supply at period t is ambiguous and depends upon the strength of the substitution and the
wealth e¤ects.
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3 Empirical Issues and Identication Strategy
Empirically identifying the causal e¤ect of school enrollment age on maternal labor market
outcomes is challenging due to the endogeneity of entrance age. Ideally, one can estimate
the e¤ect of kindergarten attendance on maternal labor supply using the following equation:
Yi = Si +X
0
i + i
Where Yi measures maternal labor supply outcomes, Si is an indicator for whether the
child is attending kindergarten at age 5 and Xi is a vector of controls. The causal inter-
pretation depends on the assumption that E[SiijXi] = 0. However, there are two potential
sources of bias in the OLS estimates of the e¤ect of entrance age on maternal labor supply.
First, entrance age is correlated with parental and child unobservable characteristics that
may themselves be directly related to maternal labor market outcomes. For instance, parents
are more likely to delay school entry for a child with learning disabilities. At the same time,
mothers of such children are also less likely to work. Therefore, if we do not control for the
unobserved ability of a child, we would overestimate the negative e¤ect of school entrance
age on the mothers labor supply. A second source of bias in the estimated coe¢ cients may
also be due to the simultaneity of school entrance age and parental labor supply. The OLS
estimate of school entrance age on maternal labor supply may be contaminated by the fact
that career driven women may send their children to school early so that their labor supply
is not adversely a¤ected by an additional year of child care. Thus, depending on the impor-
tance of these two factors and the variables for which we control, the sign of the overall bias
could go in either direction.
In the existing literature, there are at least two strategies that researchers have used
to infer causality from the school attendance and maternal labor supply relation. One
identication strategy exploits variation in the availability of public schools or day care
across states and over time. Cascio (2009) used variation in preschool availability from the
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introduction of kindergarten in the United States to study the e¤ect of child care on maternal
labor supply. Using a Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences (DD) approach, she nds that single women
with kindergarten eligible children, but no younger children, were more likely to be employed
with the availability of kindergartens. Schlosser (2006) exploits a Israeli policy change that
introduced free public preschool for children aged 3 and 4 to study the e¤ect on labor supply
of Arab mothers. She nds an increase in labor supply as a consequence of the availability
of free public schools among more educated mothers. Berlinski and Galiani (2007) provide
evidence of increased maternal employment in Argentina as a result of large construction
of pre-primary school facilities. Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2008) look at the e¤ect of
increased public nancing for child care under Canadas $5 per day child careprogram on
a range of outcomes including maternal labor supply. Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete
(2009) show that Québecs universal childcare policy, which gave mothers of young children
a temporary incentive to join the labor market, led to substantial life-cycle labour supply
e¤ects. Each of these studies nds some evidence that increase in the availability of preschools
raises maternal employment, at least, for single mothers of preschool age children with no
younger children. The only exception is Fitzpatrick (2010) who does not nd a robust impact
of universal pre-K availability on maternal labor supply.
An alternative identication strategy is instrumental variable estimation of the e¤ect of
age at enrollment on maternal labor supply. One widely used instrument is quarter of birth
or, more generally, month of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Gelbach, 2002; Mayer and
Knutson, 1999). If students are allowed to enter school in the year they turn ve, children
born in the later part of the year will be less likely to be enrolled in school. Assuming
that month of birth is not correlated with unobservable characteristics, we can use month of
birth as a valid instrument for age at enrollment. Using quarter of birth as an instrument
for public school enrollment of ve year old children, Gelbach (2002) nds that women with
kindergarten eligible children worked more hours.
If quarter of birth is to be a valid instrument, it must be related to maternal labor market
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outcomes only because it a¤ects the age of enrollment of the child. However, there is some
evidence that suggests that maternal employment may be directly related to month of birth
of a child. In a recent paper, Buckles and Hungerman (2010) nd that babies born in the
winter are more likely to have mothers who are unmarried, who are teenagers or who lack a
high school diploma. Bobak & Gjonca (2001) nd that the magnitude of seasonal variation in
births was particularly strongly associated with maternal socio-demographic characteristics.
Further, in occupations that are characterized by seasonalities in labor demand, it has been
found that more babies are born in seasons of less work load (Nurge,1970). I control for
quarter of birth in my regressions to address any such concerns.
Consider the following model of the relation between age at enrollment and maternal
labor market outcomes:
Yit = tSi +X
0
it + tMi + tRi + it; t = 5; 7; ::; 10 (1)
Where, Yit is maternal labor supply measures for mother i when the child is t years old.
Si is a dummy variable indicating whether the child was enrolled in school in the year he
turned ve (Si = 0) or had delayed entry to age 6 (Si = 1). Mi is a set of dummy variables
indicating the quarter of birth or the month of birth of the child. Xi is a vector of observable
individual characteristics and Ri represents a set of state controls. All models are estimated
separately by the age of the child. As discussed earlier, the age at which a child starts school
is endogenous causing the OLS estimates of  to be biased. To control for this endogeneity,
I propose an instrumental variable estimation strategy.
I use 2SLS estimates to identify  in equation (1) above where Si is instrumented using
a dummy variable Zi that takes on a value of one if the law constrained the child to delay
entry into kindergarten. In other words if the childs month of birth lies later than the state
kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ date, Zi equals one and zero otherwise. More formally,
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I estimate the parameters of equation (1) using 2SLS based on the following rst-stage
equation for observed enrollment:
Si = tZi +X
0
it + 'tMi + tRi + it; t = 5; 7; ::; 10 (2)
All specications include controls for the month of birth of a child to take into account
the season of birth e¤ects. In addition, I control for state of residence to take into account
any state di¤erences in maternal employment opportunities.
This is not the rst study that uses variation in state kindergarten entrance age laws
and month of birth to instrument for actual entrance age. Recently several researchers have
exploited the cross state variation in school entrance age laws and variation in date of birth
to instrument for actual entry age (For example, Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Cascio and Lewis,
2005; Datar, 2005; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009). However, these studies have looked at the
e¤ect of school entry age on child outcomes. The only exception is Fitzpatrick (2010) who
uses the discontinuity generated by birthday-based eligibility cuto¤s to study the e¤ect of
universal pre-K availability on maternal labor supply. Unlike previous research, this is the
rst study that exploits the state laws and month of birth variation to look at long run
maternal labor market outcomes. In addition, as discussed extensively in Barua and Lang
(2010), if there is heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects, the instrument used here identies
(under some reasonable assumptions) the Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE) i.e. the
labor supply e¤ect on those women who decide to delay school entry only because the law
constrains them to do so.
I implement the above empirical strategy in the following way. First, I estimate the
e¤ect of a ve year olds school enrollment on maternal labor supply. Next, I explore long
run outcomes by estimating equation (1) using 2SLS for a sample of 7 to 10 year old children.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 US 1980 Census
The data for 5 year old children is drawn from 1980 US Census 5% Public Use Microdata
(PUMS). Since the Census day in 1980 was April 1st, I restrict the sample to 5 year olds
who were born in quarters two through four and 6 year old children born in the rst quarter
(i.e. those who turned 5 in 1979). A children le was created for each household with
corresponding information on the childs characteristics and mothers information.
For the analysis with ve year old children, the main explanatory variable is the school
attendance dummy variable. I use the census school attendance variable where I code atten-
dance as 1 if the child is attending a public, private or church related private school. The
dummy is coded as zero if the child is not enrolled in any school. Though school entry age
laws do not directly a¤ect attendance for children who go to private schools, I choose to
keep them in the sample because the attendance pattern of these children are likely to be
inuenced by state laws. Some parents may send their children to private schools to get
around the strict cuto¤s imposed by public schools. In addition, the decision to send a child
to a private school would also directly depend upon the availability of public schools.
While the Census provides accurate information on attendance for those children who
turned 5 in 1979, it cannot be used to study the e¤ect of prior school attendance on older
children. This is because the Census does not report the school entrance age of respondents.
School entrance age can still be computed for each child using grade information if I assume
that no child repeats or skips a grade. However, entrance age computed using this method
will be distorted because of the prevalence of grade repeaters. To circumvent this data
limitation, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate the e¤ect
of delayed school entry on long run maternal labor supply measures. The NLSY sample is
discussed in detail in the next subsection.
The ideal instrument for this analysis would exploit variation in exact date of birth and
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state laws. But the census does not have month of birth information in the public use les.
Instead I use information on quarter of birth and state laws to determine whether the law
required a child to delay entry into kindergarten from the year he turned ve to the year he
turned six. I deleted observations for whom I could not determine whether the child was born
before or after the state cut-o¤. For example, I dropped children born in the third quarter
who went to kindergarten in states with a mid-third quarter cut-o¤. Similarly the sample
does not include children who are born in the fourth quarter in states with a mid-fourth
quarter cut o¤.
I estimate the equations separately for married mothers and single mothers between
the age of 21 and 50. The census has extensive information on maternal characteristics,
family background and schooling, allowing me to include a rich set of controls in the baseline
regressions. All specications control for quarter of birth of the child and state of residence. I
also control for a quadratic function of the mothers age, her race, education, SMSA dummy,
log of spouseincome, number of children, number of adult family members and whether she
is the head of the household.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the census regressions.
Means and standard deviations are reported for the three samples on which the census
analysis is based, namely, (i) married mothers whose youngest child is age 5, (ii) single
mothers whose youngest child is age 5 and (iii) married mothers of 5 year old children who
also have additional younger children. As would be expected, single mothers of ve year old
children work more than married mothers whose youngest child is ve, are more likely to be
household heads, less likely to be white, have fewer adult members in the household and are
younger on average.
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Variables for the sample of 5 Year olds
(Census)
Variable
Married Mothers
(youngest is 5 years
old)
Single Mothers
(youngest is 5 years
old)
Married Mothers
(with younger than 5-yr
old Child)
Usual Hours Worked 19.85 26.60 14.37
(18.98) (18.99) (18.21)
Employment in 1979 0.59 0.72 0.45
(0.49) (0.45) (0.50)
Wks Worked in 1979 22.52 29.27 14.85
(22.59) (22.63) (20.25)
White 0.87 0.64 0.86
(0.33) (0.48) (0.34)
Age 32.57 29.97 29.21
(5.39) (5.85) (4.47)
Education 12.24 11.74 12.33
(2.54) (2.42) (2.80)
Log(Spouse’s) Income 8.63 8.57
(3.01) (2.98)
Number of Children 2.35 2.03 2.92
(1.17) (1.25) (1.18)
# of Adult Members 1.15 0.65 1.11
(0.49) (1.04) (0.44)
SMSA 0.75 0.81 0.74
(0.44) (0.39) (0.45)
Head of Household 0.03 0.80 0.02
(0.16) (0.40) (0.15)
Total Sample Size 42,500 11,690 41,795
4.2 NLSY79
As discussed earlier, the census does not have school entrance age information. To study the
long run e¤ects of delayed school entry on maternal labor supply of married mothers, I use
data from NLSY79. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY79) is
a panel survey of 12,686 nationally representative men and women between the ages of 14
and 21 as of December 31, 1978. The NLSY79 contains extensive information on the labor
market experience, education, family, demographics and habits of the respondents. Since
1986, the children of the original 6,283 NLSY79 women have been assessed every two years.
In addition to the public use les of the NLSY, I obtained information about exact date of
births and state of residence from the NLSY condential Geocode les.
The school entrance age variable was computed using data on last grade attended, in-
terview dates and grades repeated or skipped for children who were enrolled in school. The
survey contains several questions pertaining to grade attended and grades completed. I used
this information, combined with information on grades skipped or repeated, to compute the
age at which the child entered kindergarten. The NLSY asks the respondents questions about
14
the last grade attended or currently attending. One problem with the way the question is
framed is that a respondent who answered the question in January, for instance, would be
referring to the grade that he entered in the previous calendar year. To address this data
limitation, I used interview dates to verify the exact age of entrance. To be consistent, any
respondent who was asked about his last grade attended in or before July was assumed to
have started that grade in the previous calendar year. On the other hand any respondent
who was interviewed in August or later was assumed to be referring to the grade he entered
in the current calendar year. Observations that did not have su¢ cient information to com-
pute the entrance ages were deleted from the sample leaving me with a sample size of 7448
children and young adults for whom entrance age information could be computed.
Unfortunately it is not possible to replicate the census analysis for ve year old children
using the NLSY sample. I ran into several data problems while trying to create the school
attendance variable for ve and six year old children and variables related to the mothers
labor supply. Unlike the census which has a unique census day (1stApril 1980), the NLSY is
a rolling survey. For most years a majority of interviews were scheduled over the summer.
This made it di¢ cult to interpret the school enrollment variable for ve and six year olds. For
these two age groups, I could not ascertain whether they would be enrolled in kindergarten
in the academic year beginning in Fall of the year of the interview. In addition, the mothers
work variables also corresponded to a period when the child was not enrolled in school.
I could have used a sample of mothers of ve and six year olds who were interviewed in
September or later but, when I tried to construct this sample, I was left with a very small
number of observations and the estimates obtained were very unstable. Since all children
were enrolled in school by the age of 7, none of these concerns would bias my estimates and
therefore I decided to restrict the sample to children aged 7 and above.
I construct a pooled cross section of children between the age of 7 to 10 years in the
period 1980 to 2000. The mothers labor supply measures as well as all the right hand side
variables are created by the age of the child. For example, in the regressions for 7 year old
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children, I include the values of the right hand side variables and the dependent variable
corresponding to the year that the child turned 7. All regressions include controls for month
of birth of child, year of birth dummies and dummies for the state in which the child went
to kindergarten. In addition, the regressions also include a set of controls for mothers
characteristics including race, standardized AFQT, log of husbands income, age, family size,
number of children, presence of an elderly relative, state of current residence dummies and
a dummy for the presence of a child younger than age 5.2
I study the e¤ect of delayed school entry on three di¤erent measures of maternal labor
supply; employment status during the survey week, weeks worked since last interview and
usual hours worked per week in current/most recent job. The weeks worked variable is dened
as the proportion of weeks worked since last interview (weeks worked since last interview
divided by weeks since last interview). The NLSY has another accompanying variable that
tells the user the percentage of weeks unaccounted for while computing weeks worked. Those
respondents who show some percentage of weeks unaccounted for have missing or inconsistent
work information that does not allow an employment status for that week. In my analysis I
only keep observations for whom all weeks have been taken into account. Finally, all hourly
wages are converted to real terms ($2000) using the personal consumption expenditure price
index.
4.3 State Kindergarten Entrance Age Policies
The identication strategy required knowledge of exact kindergarten entry cut-o¤ dates for
every state in the US. Data on state kindergarten entrance ages laws were gathered from
various sources to get accurate information. I gathered information on school cut-o¤ dates
for several years from the Education Commission of the States. These laws were veried
by looking at the US historical state statutes. If the history of the statute indicated a
2Presence of an elderly relative in the household is dened as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the mother reports having parents, grandparents, in-laws and grandparents-in-laws living in the household
during the time of the survey.
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change in the state law at any given year, I examined the relevant state session law to
determine the exact form of the change. As a result, I was able to gather information on
kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ dates for all US states for the period 1979 to 2000. Table 2
lists the kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤ dates in 1979 for all states included in the sample.
Eight states (Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Vermont) that had given Local Education Authorities (LEA) the power
to set the entrance age law were deleted from the sample.
Table 2: Kindergarten Entrance Age Laws in 1979 for US States
State State Cut Off
Date
State Cut Off
Month*
Alabama 1 October
Alaska 2 November
Arizona 1 January
Arkansas 1 October
California 1 December
Connecticut 1 January
Delaware 1 January
DC 31 December
Florida 1 January
Georgia 1 September
Hawaii 31 December
Idaho 16 October
Illinois 1 December
Iowa 15 September
Kansas 1 September
Kentucky 1 October
Maine 15 October
Maryland 31 December
Michigan 1 December
Minnesota 1 September
Mississippi 1 January
Missouri 1 October
Montana 10 September
Nebraska 15 October
Nevada 30 September
New Mexico 1 September
New York 1 December
North Carolina 16 October
North Dakota 1 October
Ohio 30 September
Oklahoma 1 November
Oregon 15 November
Rhode Island 31 December
South Carolina 1 November
South Dakota 1 September
Tennessee 31 October
Texas 1 September
Utah 1 September
Virginia 1 December
Washington 31 August
West Virginia 1 September
Wisconsin 1 September
Wyoming 15 September
Source: Education Commission of States, State Legal Statutes
*The States of Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and Vermont were deleted from the sample because the eligibility age was set by the Local Education
Authority (LEA) in these states.
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Figure 2 compares the proportion of states by the cut-o¤ month in 1979 with the corre-
sponding proportions in 2000. Most states in 1979 had fourth quarter cuto¤s, fourteen states
had September cuto¤s while ve states had January rst cuto¤s. The prevalence of fourth
quarter cuto¤s also implies that most states allowed children to enter kindergarten before
their fth birthday. The gure shows that in recent years there has been a trend towards
increasing the school entry age and most states are moving towards a September cut-o¤.
Figure 2: Proportion of States by Kindergarten Cut-Off Month, 1980-2000
Note:
· Compiled using data from various sources
· LEA refers to Local Education Authority
· End of month cut offs have been clubbed with the following month. For example, a 30th September Cut off is
counted in the month of October
5 Results
5.1 OLS and 2SLS Estimates for 5 Year Old Children
Using data from the 1980 census, I estimate the e¤ect of school enrollment on the labor
supply of mothers3. The analysis is done separately for three samples of women, namely,
married mother whose youngest child is ve years old, single mothers whose youngest is age
3I have estimated similar models for fathers but I do not nd any e¤ect on their labor market outcomes.
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5 and married mothers with children younger than ve years old but whose ve year old is
the eldest.
Table 3: Summary of First Stage Regressions for 5 Year Olds from Census Data (Just Identified
Model)
Married Mothers
(no younger
children)
Single Mothers
(no younger
children)
Married Mothers
(younger than 5
year old)
Coefficient on the Instrument  0.328***
(0.021)
 0.289***
(0.023)
 0.335***
(0.034)
Quarter of Birth 2 -0.006
(0.005)
-0.012**
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.004)
Quarter of Birth 3 -0.020***
(0.006)
-0.015**
(0.005)
-0.019***
(0.005)
Quarter of Birth 4 -0.063***
(0.015)
-0.046**
(0.020)
-0.109***
(0.032)
White -0.013*
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.006)
Education (Mother)  0.010***
(0.002)
 0.010***
(0.002)
 0.009***
(0.001)
# of Adult Family Members -0.009**
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Log (Spouse’s Income)  0.002***
(0.000)
 0.003***
(0.000)
# Own Children in the Household -0.001
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.013***
(0002)
SMSA  0.037***
(0.007)
 0.020**
(0.009)
 0.028***
(0.006)
Household Head  0.000
(0.011)
 0.012
(0.011)
-0.010
(0.009)
Age (Mother)  0.022***
(0.003)
 0.007
(0.004)
 0.023***
(0.004)
Age Square -0.000***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
F (test of excluded instrument)  253.62  159.44  96.92
P value of F-statistic for the
Instrument
 0.0000  0.0000  0.000
Centered R-Squared  0.225  0.145  0.248
Partial R-Squared  0.031  0.025  0.027
Sample Size  37246  10700  36941
Heteroskedasticity Robust standard errors in parenthesis
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Regressions also include State Fixed Effects
The rst stage relation between the instrument (Dummy variable =1 if born before the
cut o¤) and the endogenous variable (Dummy variable =1 if enrolled in school at age 5)
provides some useful preliminary insight into the underlying relation between the variables
of interest. Table 3 conrms that there is a very strong correlation between school eligibility
and school enrollment. For mothers of ve year olds, with no younger children, the rst stage
coe¢ cient on the instrument is equal to 0.289 and 0.328 for the regressions on single and
married women respectively. The coe¢ cient on married mothers who have younger than
ve year old children is 0.335. These coe¢ cients are very highly statistically signicant.
The rst stage F-statistics are high, 159.4 for the regressions on single women and 253.6 for
the married women regressions. These estimates also suggest that controlling for observable
characteristics, children born in the fourth quarter are least likely to be enrolled in school
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as compared to children born in the rst quarter. The likelihood of school attendance is
declining with the quarter of birth of the child. The F-statistics suggest that there is a strong
correlation between the school attendance variable and the law enforced school eligibility and
so the weak instrument problem should not be a concern in the analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 report the results from the regression of di¤erent measures of maternal
labor supply, for married mothers whose youngest child is age 5, on a 5 year olds school
attendance. I consider four measures of labor supply, namely, employment in 1979, weeks
worked in 1979, usual hours worked per week and labor force participation. The endogenous
explanatory variable in these regressions is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the 5 year old is enrolled in a school and zero otherwise.4
In table 4, employment in 1979 is regressed on the school enrollment dummy. I tried
probit versions of all regressions but since the results do not change much with the probit
specication, I decided to report estimates from the linear models only. Column (1) reports
the OLS estimate from a linear regression with no controls. In column (2), a rich set of
controls are added. In addition, regressions include controls for quarter of birth and state
xed e¤ects. The reported heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state
times quarter of birth. I get comparable standard error estimates when clustered only at the
state level.
The OLS estimates imply that, among married mothers, having a child enrolled in school
increases employment by 5.2 percent. The IV estimates imply that OLS is downward biased,
conrming the results obtained in previous studies (Gelbach, 2002). This is perhaps because
high income parents are more likely to delay entry. But such parents are also more likely
to continue working since they are able to a¤ord child care costs. Controlling for quarter of
birth, IV estimates in column (4) suggest that married mothers of 5 year old children, who are
enrolled in school, are 11 percent more likely to work. This is a big e¤ect and amounts to a
4Since school term begins in September in most states, this implies that my estimates for 5 year olds is
measuring the e¤ect of school enrollment only for the month of September and the last quarter. Therefore,
it should be kept in mind that the e¤ect of a child care subsidy for the entire year would be almost three
times as large as the estimates reported in this paper.
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18 percentage point increase in baseline participation (the mean employment for this group is
59 percent). Note that the estimates in column (3), which do not control for quarter of birth,
are in line with the results reported in Gelbach (2002). This could reect the importance
of controlling for seasonalities in birth. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge
that if there is treatment e¤ect heterogeneity, then it is not obvious whether the results
from this paper are directly comparable to other studies since the population parameters
identied would have di¤erent LATE interpretations. As noted earlier, my results should be
interpreted as the labor supply response of women who decide to delay school enrollment of
their 5 year old only because the law constrains them to do so
Table 4: Effect of 5-Year Olds School Attendance on 1979 Employment Status for Married
Mothers (with no younger children)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
School attendance 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.106**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.052)
White -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mothers Education 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
# of HH Adult
Members
0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Spouse's Income) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of own children -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SMSA -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household Head 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age Squared 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 42500 37246 37246 37246
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Quarter of Birth
Dummies
No Yes No Yes
In table 5, the rst row looks at the e¤ect of school attendance on usual hours worked
per week. I estimate both a linear model and a tobit model to take into account the censored
hours data. OLS estimates are downward biased and IV estimates imply an increase of 4.3
hours per week in the linear specication (column 2) and 6.8 hours per week in the tobit
specication (column 4). The mean hours worked by this sample of women is about 20 hours
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per week implying a 21.5 to 34 percentage points increase in baseline hours worked. I also
report estimates from two more labor supply measures. Having a child enrolled in school
increases labor force participation by 7 percent, but this e¤ect is not statistically signicant
at conventional levels of signicance. Average weeks worked in 1979 increased by 1.64 weeks
in the linear specication and 4.5 weeks in the tobit model. The IV estimates therefore imply
that having a child enrolled in school increases baseline labor supply for married women by
between 7.3 to 34 percentage points.
Table 5: Effect of 5-Year Olds School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Married
Mothers (with no Younger Children)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  1.421***   4.268** 2.766***  6.764**
(0.453)  (1.782) (0.740) (2.948)
Labor Force Status  0.074***   0.071
(0.014)  (0.059)
Weeks Worked in 1979  2.924***   1.625  8.082*** 4.482
(0.539) (2.050) (1.428) (3.290)
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Sample size is 37246
Note that the IV estimates, though large in magnitude, are imprecise relative to the OLS
estimates. The standard Hausman test is not applicable in this analysis due to clustered
standard errors. Instead, I use an asymptotically equivalent version of the Hausman test to
test for endogeneity. I take the residual from the rst stage of the regression and include
it as an additional regressor in the original OLS equation. The t value on the residual is
insignicant for all the labor supply measures. A Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis
that the OLS estimates are consistent, indicating that endogeneity may not be a substantial
issue here.
Table 6 and 7 estimate the corresponding labor supply equations for single mothers. The
OLS estimates for single mothers are larger than the OLS estimates for married mothers,
but the e¤ect disappears in the IV specication. In comparison to the results for married
women, IV estimates for single women imply that having a child in school does not have
any statistically signicant e¤ect on labor supply measures. Single women with 5 year olds,
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who are enrolled in schools, are 2.1 percent more likely to be employed in 1979, work about
2 hours more per week and 1.6 weeks more relative to mothers whose child is not enrolled
in school. In terms of the magnitude of this e¤ect with respect to the baseline means, this
translates to very small and statistically insignicant e¤ect on labor supply measures. Once
again, Hausman test fails to reject exogeneity. If one is willing to accept failure to reject as
an acceptance of the hypothesis, then OLS estimates are in line with Gelbach (2002).
Table 6: Effect of 5-Year Olds School Attendance on 1979 Employment Status for Single
Mothers (with no younger children)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
School attendance 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.053* 0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.031) (0.056)
White 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mothers Education 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
# of Adult HH
Members
0.014** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
# of own children -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SMSA -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Household Head 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 11690 10700 10700 10700
R-squared 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.14
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Quarter of Birth
Dummies
No Yes No Yes
Table 7: Effect of 5-Year Olds School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Single Mothers
(with no Younger Children)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  2.506***   0.187  3.849***  0.247
(0.654)  (2.919) (0.949) (3.721)
Labor Force Status  0.082*** - 0.028
(0.018)  (0.075)
Weeks Worked in 1979  3.996***   1.656  10.287***  1.426
(0.786)  (3.433) (2.070) (4.263)
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Sample Size = 10700
The di¤erence in the estimates for single and married women is not surprising for atleast
three reasons. First, several researchers have found that the labor supply measures for single
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mothers are less responsive to child care prices than labor supply measures for married
mothers (Connelly 1990; Kimmel 1998; Michalopoulas et. al. 1992). Single women are the
sole bread earners for the family and their own income is typically low. As a result they are
more likely to rely on relatives and less likely to rely on center-based arrangements or private
market child care facilities (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998). Since free public schools
are simply a substitute for the informal child care provided through relatives and friends,
the labor supply measures do not respond to the availability of free schools. Second, single
women, on an average, work more hours than married women. Theoretically, as explained
in section II, women who work less than the hours of school day are the ones who are most
likely to be induced to increase their labor supply. Finally, the e¤ect of school enrollment on
the labor supply of single women is not easily interpretable due to the complex behavioral
relation between paid child care, public assistance (such as the AFDC) and labor supply.
The labor supply response of single women to the school enrollment of her child may be
inelastic due to the high cost associated with losing AFDC eligibility.
Next, I estimate the e¤ect of a ve year olds school attendance on the labor supply
of married women who have additional younger children at home.5 For women who have
younger than school age children at home, the labor supply response to her 5 year olds school
attendance is slightly more complicated. The hourly rate for childcare depends, among other
things, on the number of children being cared for. For women who do not have additional
younger children, the drop in child care costs when her 5 year old enrols in school can be
substantial. On the other hand, for women with additional younger children, the drop in
hourly child care costs from caring for three children to two children, for example, is only
marginal. Thus, we should expect the labor supply response to be relatively smaller in
magnitude. Table 8 shows the coe¢ cients from regressions of school attendance on all four
labor supply measures for this sample of women. Column (1) reports the OLS estimates from
the linear regression of all four labor supply measures on public school attendance dummy.
5In regressions not shown here, I dont nd any e¤ect of school enrollment on labor supplied by single
mothers who have additional younger children.
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Table 8: Effect of 5-Year Olds School Attendance on Labor Supply Measures of Married
Mothers with Younger than 5 Year Old Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV Tobit IV Tobit
Worked in 1979  0.051***   0.052
(0.009)  (0.036)
Usual Hrs Worked/Week  1.253***   1.096  3.431***  3.517
(0.360)  (1.286) (0.787) (2.743)
Labor Force Status  0.052***   0.050
(0.010)  (0.034)
Weeks Worked in 1979  1.942***   4.124***  6.452*** 3.767
(0.378) (1.521) (1.175) (2.469)
Quarter of Birth Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
State Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Sample size = 36941
Column (2) reports the 2SLS estimates while columns (3) and (4) report estimates from
the corresponding tobit model for weeks of work and hours of work. Interestingly for this
group the OLS and IV have the same magnitude for three of the four labor supply variables.
However, unlike the OLS estimates, IV coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent from zero
for three of the measures of labor supply. There is a large e¤ect of school enrollment on weeks
worked in 1979, an increase of 4 weeks or 27 percent of mean weeks, in the linear model,
but the e¤ect disappears when censoring is taken into account in column (4). Perhaps these
women are choosing to work for longer (in terms of weeks of work) periods of time in exchange
for no change in intensity of work.
To sum the results obtained from the census regressions; IV estimates imply that having a
child enrolled in school increases labor supply measures for married women, with no younger
children, by between 7 to 34 percent. In contrast to the results for married mothers, I do
not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect on labor market outcomes for single mothers. For
married mothers with younger than ve year old children, there is a non trivial increase in
weeks worked but the other labor supply measures are not statistically signicant though
the estimated magnitudes are generally not small.
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5.2 Long Run E¤ect of Delayed School Entry on Maternal Labor
Supply
The census results show that having a 5 year old in school increased the labor supply of
married women. This is not a surprising result given that public schooling in the United
States is free and theoretically it is comparable to a 100% price subsidy on child care. A
more interesting question is related to the labor supply of mothers whose child delayed school
entry. How would the life cycle labor supply prole of these women di¤er from the labor
supply prole of women who received the subsidy a year earlier? To answer this question,
I use the NLSY to study labor supply outcomes for a pooled cross section of mothers of 7
to 10 year olds. As discussed earlier, due to data limitations, I do not estimate the e¤ect
of school enrollment of 5 or 6 year old children on maternal outcomes using data from the
NLSY.
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the NLSY regressions
for a pooled cross section of married mothers of 7 year old children.6 Column (1) reports
means and standard deviations of variables for the entire sample of 7 year old children and
their mothers. Column (2) and (3) report descriptive statistics for the sample of 7 year old
children born before and after, respectively, the state kindergarten entrance age cut-o¤. The
last column reports t-statistics and p-values for a test of di¤erences in means from column
(2) and (3). Two things are evident from this table. First, the means suggest that mothers of
children born after the cut-o¤, and thus who delayed school entry, have higher average work
measures not controlling for any other factors. This is veried by looking at the t-values and
p-values for at least two of the three variables, namely, weeks worked and employment status.
Second, comparing the average values of the variables with the census variables (table 2) it
is clear that the NLSY sample is not di¤erent in terms of the observables. All the control
variables have similar averages across the two sample. However, the average usual hours
6I replicated the analysis described in this section for single women from the NLSY. I get extremely
imprecise and unstable estimates for these women, conrming the results obtained from the census. Though
I have not reported these estimates, the full tables are available on request.
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worked per week variable is very large in the NLSY relative to the census (34 hours and 20
hours respectively). This di¤erence is due to the di¤erent ways that the variable is measured
in the two samples. While the census reports the average hours worked per week in all jobs,
the NLSY variable reports the average hours worked per week in the current/most recent
job. Similarly, the di¤erence in the weeks worked variable is due to the di¤erent ways it is
measured in the two samples. In the NLSY it is measured as the proportion of weeks worked
since last interview after taking into consideration any unaccounted weeks by respondents.
Table 9: Means and Standard Deviation of Variables for a sample Married Mothers of 7 Year old
Children (NLSY)
Sample of 7 Year Olds
Variable
Entire
Sample
(1)
Born Before
the cut off
(2)
Born After the
cut off
(3)
t-test
(Difference in
means is zero)1
(4)
Usual Hrs Worked 33.80 33.65 34.23 -0.96
(12.67) (12.53) (13.08) (0.3340)
Employment 0.61 0.60 0.64 -2.33
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.0199)
Weeks Worked 0.58 0.57 0.61 -2.37
(0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.0176)
Black 0.19 0.18 0.21 -2.36
(0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.0183)
Hispanics 0.22 0.23 0.20 1.93
(0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.0531)
Mothers AFQT -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -1.22
(0.95) (0.96) (0.92) (0.2206)
Mothers Grade 12.33 12.32 12.36 -0.40
(2.42) (2.46) (2.27) (0.6915)
Mothers Age 30.82 30.97 30.36 3.53
(4.32) (4.33) (4.24) (0.0004)
Ln(Spouse’s) Income          8.76 8.80 8.62 1.27
(3.39) (3.38) (3.46) (0.2028)
Child less than 5 0.53 0.53 0.54 -0.99
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.3187)
Number of Children 2.61 2.61 2.60 0.39
(1.07) (1.09) (1.03) (0.6936)
Family size 4.68 4.68 4.67 0.17
(1.23) (1.24) (1.17) (0.8615)
Elderly in Household 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.69
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.4884)
Observations 3803 2886 (75.89%) 917 (24.11%)
The e¤ect of delayed school enrollment on usual hours worked per week in the main job
is shown in Table 10. Each row corresponds to the age of the child for whom the analysis is
conducted. As with the census estimates, I report coe¢ cients from linear and tobit models.
The rst column shows that the rst stage coe¢ cients are large and very highly statistically
signicant. OLS estimates for both linear (Column 3) and tobit (Column 5) model are
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downward biased, wrong-signed, and very small and statistically insignicant in magnitude
up to age 9. The OLS and Tobit specications do not yield signicantly di¤erent results
owing to the small numbers of zeros in the work variables in the pooled NLSY sample. The
IV estimates suggest an interesting result in the pattern of hours worked. A mother of a 8
year old child, who delayed school entry, works about 4 hours more per week as compared
to a mother whose child went to school at age 5. This is true for mothers of 9 year old
children as well. By the time the child is 9 years old, these women are working 3 hours more
per week relative to the mothers whose child did not delay. The estimate using the Tobit
specication yield even larger coe¢ cients, roughly 4 hours, and are almost three times the
standard error. These numbers translate to approximately a 12 percentage point increase in
baseline hours worked per week by mothers of 8 and 9 year olds who delayed school entry.
The positive e¤ect of delayed enrollment on hours worked becomes statistically insignicant
by the time the child is 10 years old.
Table 10: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Usual Hours Worked per Week by Married
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY)
Age of Child
   (1)
First Stage
(2)
OLS
 (3)
2SLS
 (4)
Tobit
 (5)
IV Tobit
(6)
Observations
(7)
Age 7 0.58*** -0.91 0.66 -0.78 0.87 2177
(0.03) (0.71) (1.72) (0.70) (1.75)
Age 8 0.53*** -0.73 4.13** -0.75 4.31** 1994
(0.03) (0.81) (1.97) (0.79) (1.85)
Age 9 0.58*** -0.76 3.12** -0.57 4.17*** 1879
(0.03) (0.86) (1.45) (0.82) (1.40)
Age 10 0.55*** -2.04** -1.89 -1.94** -1.29 1659
(0.03) (0.85) (2.11) (0.82) (1.99)
This result points towards intertemporal substitution in labor supply and in particular
towards wealth e¤ects associated with lower lifetime wealth (gure 1). Though the hours
variable in the NLSY is the cleanest variable for this analysis, I study two other measures of
labor supply to further investigate this e¤ect.
Table 11 reports estimates from two more labor supply measures; employment status
during the interview week and proportion of weeks worked since last interview. Once again,
the OLS estimates are very small in magnitude, often wrong signed and very imprecise. The
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IV estimates suggest that delayed school enrollment has long run implications for maternal
labor supply. In particular, I nd that a one year delay in school entry raises the probability
of employment of a married mother by 22 percent when the child is in school at age 7.
This translates to a increase of 36 percentage points over the mean employment. There
is a 26 percentage point increase in proportion of weeks worked since last interview. In
the contemporaneous labor supply estimates using the census, I nd that weeks of work
are a¤ected only for women with additional younger children. Due to the small sample
size in the NLSY, I cannot separate married women by number of younger children in the
household. This makes it di¢ cult to determine who is driving the results in Table 11, i.e.,
whether it is being driven by married women with or without additional younger children
in the household. Regardless of this sample size limitation, table 11 shows that the large
positive e¤ects on maternal employment continue to persist for older children as well.
Table 11: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Employment and Weeks Worked by Married
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY)
Age of Child
(1)
First Stage
(2)
OLS
  (3)
2SLS
(4)
Tobit
(5)
IV Tobit
(6)
Observations
 (7)
         I. Employment
Age 7 0.59*** 0.04* 0.22*** 2874
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Age 8 0.56*** -0.02 0.02 2629
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Age 9 0.57*** 0.04 0.17*** 2392
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Age 10 0.54*** -0.00 0.14** 2054
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
           II. Weeks Worked
Age 7 0.59*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.01 0.19*** 2871
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Age 8 0.56*** 0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.12** 2623
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Age 9 0.56*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.01 0.20*** 2399
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Age 10 0.53*** -0.02 0.12* -0.01 0.17** 2056
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08)
Overall, I nd evidence to support the intertemporal substitution hypothesis. Using the
census results I nd that a child care subsidy, in the form of free or subsidized kindergarten,
increases a mothers net wage and thereby increases her labour supply relative to mothers
who do not receive this subsidy until a year later. When I look at older age groups, I
nd that mothers of delayed enrollers have higher labor supply compared to mothers of
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early enrollers. This cross-sectional approach can be interpreted in a life cycle context as
discussed in Section II. For the census results, the IV estimates identify a combination of
wealth e¤ects and intertemporal substitution e¤ects corresponding to period t in gure 1.
On the other hand, the higher labor supply estimates from the NLSY can be attributed to a
pure wealth e¤ect associated with lower lifetime wealth for mothers of delayed enrollers (i.e.
period t+ 1 in gure 1).
5.3 Younger Than Five Year Old Children
An alternative explanation for my results would rely on a static labor supply model with a
mechanical savings rule.7 More specically, a woman whose child delays entry into school
(or the constrainedwoman) works less and has lower income and savings (assuming they
save a constant fraction of income) than the counterfactualwoman who is not constrained
by the law. Since leisure is a normal good, we would expect constrained women to work less
in future due to lower wealth and non labor income. Though my results would be consistent
with this interpretation of the static theory, I briey discuss some evidence which strengthens
the life cycle interpretation of my results.
If individuals make labor supply decisions according to the life cycle model, anticipated
changes in economic and demographic factors should be factored into current labor supply
decisions. In the context of the present study, comparing women whose youngest child has
not yet reached school enrollment age would allow me to test this. Women who can enroll
their children in school at an earlier age will have higher lifetime wealth and therefore, if
leisure is a normal good, they must work less (relative to the constrained mothers) in years
before their child is age eligible. On the other hand, if women make labor supply decisions
according to the static model, we should not nd any di¤erence in labor supplied among the
two groups of women in years before their child is eligible to start school. To do a formal
instrumental variable analysis, I would need data on the actual entrance age of younger
7I thank Jonah Gelbach for pointing this out and suggesting a test of this alternative hypothesis.
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children. Since I am looking at children who have not yet started school, I cannot do a
formal test. However, I can use the census to compare summary statistics for the sample of
mothers of 3 and 4 year old children born before and after the state kindergarten entrance
age cut-o¤. Table 12 compares means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for measures
of labor supply between mothers whose youngest child is born before the cut o¤ and those
whose child is born after the state school entry age cut o¤ date. Since I am looking at three
and four year olds in the 1980 census, I merge the data with state laws from 1980 to 1982
i.e. the laws that would be in place in the year the child turns 5.
Table 12: Summary Statistics: Labor Supply Measures for Mothers of 3 and 4 Year Olds
Hours/Week Worked in
1979
Labor Force
Status
Weeks in
1979
Sample
Size
All
   Born before the cut off 17.63 0.53 0.46 19.04 137022
(18.96) (0.50) (0.50) (21.93)
   Born after the cut off 18.54 0.55 0.47 19.83 22783
(19.25) (0.50) (0.50) (22.06)
   t-test -6.71 -5.58 -1.67 -5.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000)
Married
   Born before the cut off 16.74 0.51 0.44 18.26 112614
(18.67) (0.50) (0.50) (21.67)
   Born after the cut off 17.32 0.52 0.44 18.70 19301
(18.94) (0.50) (0.50) (21.77)
   t-test -4.02 -2.91 0.045 -2.59
(0.000) (0.004) (0.964) (0.010)
Single
   Born before the cut off 21.75 0.60 0.56 22.64 24408
(19.72) (0.49) (0.50) (22.73)
   Born after the cut off 25.30 0.68 0.62 26.10 3482
(19.55) (0.47) (0.48) (22.56)
   t-test -10.0 -9.2 -6.7 -8.4
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
I nd that all mothers of three and four year old children who are born before the state cut
o¤(i.e. who are eligible to enroll at age 5) have lower average labor supply. The t-statistic for
the test of di¤erence in means is large and the corresponding two-tailed p-value is less than
0.05 for all measures except labor force status. The same result holds for married mothers.
However, interestingly, the biggest di¤erence in means corresponds to single mothers for
whom all measures of labor supply are signicantly lower for mothers of children born before
the state cut-o¤. I also veried these ndings in reduced form regressions where I regressed
labor supply measures on the instrument (a dummy variable Zi that takes on a value of one
31
if the law constrained the child to delay entry into kindergarten) and all the control variables
used in the baseline regressions.8 Reduced form regressions yield positive but statistically
insignicant coe¢ cients for married women. On the other hand, for single mothers, there
is a positive and signicant e¤ect of being delayed by law on three of the four labor supply
measures. They are 5% percent more likely to be employed in 1979, work about 2 hours
more per week and 2.4 weeks more relative to mothers whose child is eligible to enroll in
school at age 5. The reduced form regressions and the evidence presented in table 12 further
give credibility to my baseline results. At the same time, they also suggest that single and
married women are responding to the child care subsidy at di¤erent points of time. However,
the data and identication strategy used in this paper does not allow me to investigate this
further, I leave that to future research.
5.4 E¤ect of Delayed School Entry on Wages
Next, I estimate the e¤ect of delayed school enrollment on maternal wages to study if the
loss in experience translates into wage e¤ects. One problem in empirically estimating a
wage function is non random selection into work. Most studies treat non workers as earning
zero wages or they drop them from the analysis. In the context of this paper, a potential
problem with dropping women who were not working is that the decision to not work may
be inuenced by the age at which the child went to school. It is possible that the mother of
a delayedchild decides not to work because she faces lower wages relative to mothers who
have worked an additional year because they sent their child to school at age 5. In that case,
dropping them from the analysis would bias the IV estimates. Given the sizeable increase in
maternal labor supply, selection issues cannot be ignored. To correct for this selection bias,
I conduct a wage imputation exercise and compare these estimates to the results obtained
by treating non workers as having zero wages.
The longitudinal nature of the NLSY allows me to implement a method to correct for
8Not shown here, but available upon request.
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the sample-selection bias. I exploit the panel nature of the NLSY to impute wages for those
workers who were not working in at least one of the four years of analysis. First, I convert
the hourly wage rates of the current or most recent job into real wages in 2000 dollars using
the personal consumption expenditure price index. If a woman reports having never been
employed, I drop her from the analysis. For women who worked exactly one year during the
period when her child was between age 7 and age 10, I compute the percentile rank based
on the wage distribution for that year. I assign an imputed wage to all the missing years
that corresponds to this percentile ranking in the wage distribution at that point of time.
For women who reported working in two or three years out of the four years of analysis,
I construct a percentile ranking that is a weighted average of her percentile ranking in the
wage distributions of the observed years. The weights correspond to the inverse of the square
of the distance between the observed year and the year with the missing information. The
implicit identifying assumption is that a persons percentile ranking in the wage distribution
does not change when switching employment status.
Table 13: Effect of Delayed School Attendance on Log (Hourly Wage) Earned by Married
Mothers of 7 to 10 Year old Children (NLSY)
Age   OLS
(Imputed
Wage)
  IV
(Imputed
Wage)
Obs OLS   IV Observations
Age 7 0.032 -0.024 2221 0.044 -0.046 2096
(0.036) (0.074) (0.040) (0.080)
Age 8 0.087** -0.038 2149 0.095** -0.002 1931
(0.037) (0.089) (0.044) (0.091)
Age 9 -0.042 -0.050 1952 -0.009 0.009 1816
(0.041) (0.090) (0.042) (0.084)
Age 10 0.076*  0.072 1811 0.100** 0.045 1608
(0.041) (0.093) (0.039) (0.089)
Table 13 reports estimates obtained using this method and compares them to results ob-
tained from a wage regression without imputation. The OLS estimates suggest that mothers
of children who delayed school entry earn higher wages relative to mothers whose child was
enrolled in school at age 5. A mother of a 8 year old who delayed school entry earns 9%
higher wages (Column 2) as compared to a mother whose child went to school at age 5. This
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e¤ect disappears when I instrument for delayed enrollment suggesting that OLS is biased
upwards. This is what one would expect given that rich parents are more likely to delay
school entry and the OLS estimates do not control for this e¤ect. On the other hand, the IV
estimates suggest that there is no statistically signicant relation between wages and delayed
enrollment. The point estimates are very small in magnitude and statistically insignicant
for all age groups. However, the sign on the wage coe¢ cient for mothers of 7 and 8 year
olds is what one would expect if there are any experience e¤ects. Another interesting result
is that the estimates are not highly sensitive to the wage imputation. Thus, selection bias
does not seem to be a matter of concern in this analysis.
5.5 Back-of-the-EnvelopeElasticity Estimates
A study by the U.S. Census Bureau provides some useful statistics that can be used to
monetize the implicit child care subsidy to parents due to a year of school enrollment.9 The
study reports various aggregate child care statistics for the period 1984 to 2002 using data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). On average, working mothers,
with children younger than age 5, spend $122 in weekly child care payments. Preschool age
children, with working mothers, spent on an average 32.5 hours every week in paid child care
arrangements (including day care centers and family based day cares). This amounts to an
expenditure of $3.75 per hour in child care costs. In addition, data from the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES) suggest that the average length of school day in elementary
school is about 6.7 hours in a 180 days school year (approximately 1200 hours in a year).
Thus, for mothers who would otherwise not be working, free school for their child amounts
to an average child care subsidy of $4522.5. For these women, the subsidy is a pure price
e¤ect that induces them to work. However, for mothers who choose to work more than 1200
annual hours, the subsidy has a pure wealth e¤ect and therefore reduces hours of work.
How responsive is maternal labor supply to an increase in net wage due to an implicit
9Whos Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Winter 2002 Household Economic Studies,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-101.pdf
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child care subsidy? The challenge in estimation of labor supply elasticities is to separate
the part of the labor supply response attributable to intertemporal substitution e¤ects from
the part due to wealth e¤ects. To estimate these elasticities, one would ideally estimate the
parameters of a structural model in a life cycle setting. A formal analysis of this type is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, to compare my results with the literature that
directly estimates the elasticities, I do some back-of-the-envelopecalculations to get a sense
of the labor supply response to intertemporal wage changes.
Note that, if there are some women who are reducing hours because their child is re-
ceiving public education, I would be underestimating the intertemporal and uncompensated
elasticity. Also, kindergarten is often a mixture of full and half-day. The elasticity estimates,
and particularly the wealth e¤ects, will be overestimated if many women chose to send their
children to half-day kindergartens. Data from the NCES suggests that in 1980, 30% of
kindergartners between the ages of 4 to 6 attended full day kindergarten.10 However, many
half-day kindergartens had inexpensive extended day programs attached to them. So the
estimated elasticities could be up to twice the true numbers but more plausibly is somewhere
in between.
The change in labor supply in period t can be decomposed into a component due to
change in wages holding the marginal utility of wealth constant and a component due to the
wealth e¤ect of a parametric permanent shift in the marginal utility of wealth. In terms of
elasticities, this can be written as:
t =  + 
@ lnt
@ lnWt
=  + t (3)
Where,  is the own uncompensated elasticity (holding constant initial wealth) of labor
supply in period t,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  refers to the wealth
e¤ect of a permanent shift in marginal utility of wealth (). Since t < 0; the intertemporal
substitution elasticity exceeds the own uncompensated elasticity i.e.  > f + tg. In the
10http://www.childtrendsdatabank.org/pdf/102_PDF.pdf
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context of this paper, the own uncompensated elasticity is given by:
t =
d lnh(t)
d lnw(t)
=
d lnh(t)
d(subsidy)
 d(subsidy)
d lnw(t)
(4)
Where h is the hours worked, w is the wage and subsidyis the implicit child care subsidy
due to school enrollment at age 5. This may be re-written as:
5 =
dh5
d(subsidy)
 1
h5
 d(subsidy)
dw5
 w5 (5)
I can estimate this elasticity with all values evaluated at the mean:
5 = 6:8 
1
19:8
 1
3:75
 8:3 = 0:76
Where dh5
d(subsidy)
= 6:8 is taken from the coe¢ cient on usual hours worked per week from
Table 5 (column 4), h5 is the average hours worked per week by married women with ve
year olds (Table 1) and w5 is the average hourly wage for the same group of women.
In order to get an estimate of the wealth e¤ect, in principal I would need measures of
initial assets A(0), lifetime wage prole, interest rates, rate of time preference and unmea-
sured characteristics. However, as shown in gure 1, the e¤ect of an increase in net wage
on labor supply at any period following period t may be attributed to a pure wealth e¤ect.
Therefore, the wealth elasticity of labor supply using data for mothers of 8 year old children
from the NLSY is given by (evaluated at mean):
8 = 8 = ( 4:3) 
1
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 1
3:75
 11 =  0:37
Where dh8
d(subsidy)
= 4:3 is the coe¢ cient, from column 6 in Table 10, on hours worked per
week by mothers of 8 year olds. The average hours worked per week for this sample is 34
hours and the average hourly wage is $11. To get a rough estimate of the intertemporal
elasticity, I assume that the wealth e¤ects are the same in period t (corresponding to 5 year
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olds) and t + 1 (corresponding to 8 year olds).11 Thus, substituting the value of  and 
into equation (3), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , is equal to 1.13. Finally,
given the value of  and , I can get bounds on the own compensated elasticity  (Macurdy,
1981). If leisure is a normal good, then,  >  > f + tg which gives bounds on the own
compensated elasticity as 1:13 >  > 0:76:12
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report the estimates of own wage uncompensated elastici-
ties from various recent studies. They nd that the median elasticity among these studies was
0.78 for married women which is comparable to the uncompensated elasticity estimate of 0.76
obtained in this paper. The wealth elasticity estimate of -0.37 is in line with the estimates
obtained by several authors for the elasticity of married womens labor supply with respect
to nonlabor income (including assets, spouses income and other nonlabor earnings).13 Fi-
nally, there is a wide array of estimates in the literature for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution ranging from negative values to large positive values. In the seminal econo-
metric research on life-cycle labor supply of married women, Heckman and Macurdy (1980)
nd that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for women is equal to 1. However, as
a simplifying assumption the Heckman and MaCurdy model assumes the wage prole to be
exogenous. This paper corrects for the potential bias due to the wage exogeneity assumption
that is commonly made in the intertemporal labor supply literature. My estimates of wage
elasticities suggest that previous studies have not been unduly biased by this assumption.
11In this setting, a standard time seperable utility function yields the following conditions for the change
in labor supply in period t : dHt = t dWtU 00 (Ht) +
Wt
U 00 (Ht)
dt and t+ 1 : dHt+1 =
Wt+1
U 00 (Ht+1)
dt+1. Thus, wealth
e¤ects would be the same across the two periods if I assume that U 00(:) is small and Wt and Wt+1 are close
to each other.
12Using the Slutsky equation, the own compensated elasticity is given by:
 = WtHt
@Ht
@Wt
jU = WtHt @Ht@Wt jA0  HtWt @ lnHt@A0 =  + t  HtWt @ lnHt@A0
13See for example, Goldin (1990) table 5.2 and Blau and Kahn (2007).
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6 Conclusion and Policy Implication
This is the rst study that explores the dynamic aspect of the relation between school
entrance age and maternal labor supply. I exploit the variation in school entrance ages to
study maternal labor supply in an intertemporal framework. The identication strategy
relies on comparing labor supply responses, over time, for two groups of women; those whose
5 year olds were enrolled in school and those whose children delayed enrollment. One of the
advantages of this strategy is that it gives me a simple mechanism to separate wealth e¤ects
and substitution e¤ects.
Using data from the US Census, I nd that having a 5 year old enrolled in school in-
creases labor supply measures for married women by between 7 to 34 percentage points. In
comparison to the results for married women, single women do not have any statistically
signicant e¤ect on labor supply. These results are consistent with theoretical models of
labor supply where the provision of child care subsidies is expected to increase the labor
supply of mothers.
Using a sample of older children from the NLSY, I investigate persistence in employment
outcomes for married women whose children delayed school entry. I nd evidence consistent
with the intertemporal labor supply model. IV estimates imply a 12 percentage point in-
crease in baseline hours worked per week by mothers of 8 and 9 year olds who delayed school
entry relative to those mothers whose children were enrolled in school at age 5. This e¤ect
is attributed to the wealth e¤ect associated with lower lifetime wealth for mothers of de-
layed enrollers relative to the other group. Rough calculations yield a uncompensated wage
elasticity of 0.76, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.1 and a wealth elasticity of
-0.37.
The choice of the right age at which to send a child to school has been a much debated
issue among parents and policy makers. Most of this discussion has emerged in the light of
the evidence, by various researchers, that older entrants perform better in test scores and
are more equipped to handle the pressure of formal schooling. Though no consensus has
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yet been reached on this issue, an interesting new dimension to the debate that emerges
from this paper is that school entrance laws may a¤ect families in ways other than through
child outcomes. In particular, the evidence from this paper shows that maternal labor
supply is very responsive to school entrance ages. Moreover, an important result that comes
up from my analysis relates to the large long run wealth e¤ects associated with delaying
school enrollment. These wealth e¤ects may be especially large for low income families
who are also credit constrained. Thus, education policy makers need to keep this aspect
in mind while setting the entrance age. One potential area for future work would involve
adequate modelling of intertemporal substitution e¤ects in order to evaluate the impact of
these policies on parental labor market outcomes.
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